Taxi - Appellant appeals against decision to revoke her PSV Licence and
Badge.
[2019]JRC133
Royal Court
(Samedi)
10 July 2019
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Before :
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J. A. Clyde-Smith OBE., Commissioner, and
Jurats Christensen and Hughes
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|
Between
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Erin Robyn Bisson
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Appellant
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And
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Minister for Infrastructure
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Respondent
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The Appellant appeared in person.
Advocate S. A. Meiklejohn for the Minister
judgment
the commissioner:
1.
The
Appellant appeals against the decision of the Minister for Infrastructure
(“the Minister”), taken on 15th March, 2019, to revoke
her Public Service Vehicle Licence (“PSV Licence”) and Public
Service Vehicle badge (“Badge”). The Minister considered that as a
consequence of the Appellant’s conduct over some three years, she was no
longer a fit and proper person to hold a PSV Licence and Badge.
2.
The power
to revoke a PSV Licence is contained in Article 10 of the Motor Traffic
(Jersey) Law 1935 (“the
Motor Traffic Law”), which is in these terms:-
“10 Suspension or revocation of public service
vehicle licences
(1) The Minister may revoke a public service
vehicle licence or suspend its validity, either for a specified period or for
an indefinite period, if it appears to the Minister –
(a) that its holder is no longer a fit and proper person
to operate the public service provided by the vehicle having regard to the
holder’s conduct, whether in respect of the provision of that public
service or otherwise, the manner in which the vehicle has been used or operated
or the manner in which the public service has been provided (or has failed to
be provided)…”
3.
The power
to revoke the authority given by the Badge is contained in Article 30(1) of the
Motor Traffic Law, which is in these terms:-
“30 Revocation or suspension of authority given
by a badge
(1) The Minister may, by written notice served on
the holder of a badge, revoke or suspend, either for a specified period or for
an indefinite period, the authority the badge gives the person to drive a
public service vehicle if the Minister is satisfied that, by reason of the
person’s conduct, or a physical or mental disability, the person is,
either permanently or for the time being, not a fit person to drive a public
service vehicle of the type specified on the badge.”
4.
Articles
10(3) and 30(4) of the Motor Traffic Law provide an unqualified right of appeal
against decisions of the Minister to revoke. It was not in contention that the test
on such an appeal is as set out in the case of JT (Jersey) Limited v Jersey
Competition Regulatory Authority [2013] JRC 238, where Sir Michael Birt,
then Bailiff, said this at paragraph 71:-
“71 We have carefully considered the correct
approach to be adopted in appeals under the [Telecommunications (Jersey) Law
2002] and have concluded that the Court should allow an appeal if it is
satisfied that the decision of the JCRA was wrong. It does not have to go further and
conclude that the decision was plainly wrong or so wrong as to be unreasonable,
let alone attaining the higher threshold of being Wednesbury
unreasonable. ….”
and at paragraph 74:-
“74 In summary, adapting what was said in Interface
to reflect our decision in this case, the Court will look at three aspects on
an appeal:-
(i)
It will
consider whether the decision was one which the JCRA was empowered to make i.e.
was the decision ultra vires?
(ii) It will look at the correctness and fairness of
the procedure in order to decide whether the proceedings of the JCRA were in
general sufficient and satisfactory.
(iii) It will look at the merits of the decision (as
well of course as considering matters such as whether the JCRA took into
account any irrelevant factors or failed to have regard to relevant factors)
and decide whether the Appellant has satisfied it that the decision was
wrong. In reaching its conclusion,
it will give due weight to the decision of the JCRA bearing in mind its
expertise and experience.”
These passages are equally applicable to
appeals under Article 10(3) and Article 30(4) of the Motor Traffic Law,
substituting references to the JCRA by references to the Minister.
5.
If an
appeal is allowed under Article 10(3) of the Motor Traffic Law, then the powers
of the Court are set out in Article 10(5);-
“(5) When it determines an appeal the Royal Court
may –
(a) Annul or confirm the
decision of the Minister; or
(b) Substitute for that decision any decision the
Minister could have made.
(6) The
Royal Court may make such orders as it thinks appropriate, including ancillary
orders and orders as to costs.”
The Court has the same powers if an appeal
is allowed under Article 30(4) save for provisions relating to the return of
the Badge.
6.
Also
relevant to note at this point is the Driver and Vehicle Standards
(“DVS”) Code of Conduct for taxi drivers, the following of which
are material:-
“ …
2. You
should be courteous.
…
11. You
should normally take a hirer to the destination requested but may end a hire at
any time or place if the hirer –
Acts in a disorderly manner;
Smokes in your taxi-cab;
Continues to eat or drink in your taxi-cab after you have asked them
to stop doing so;
Continues to play a radio, tape or disc after you have asked them to
stop doing so
Continues to distract your attention while driving after you have
asked them to stop doing so.
…
19. You
should not involve yourself in conflict with other road users, other PSV
drivers or members of the public, but should refer any complaint to the Driver
and Vehicle Standards Department.”
The case for
revocation
7.
By letter
dated 16th January, 2019, Mr Gordon Forrest, Head of the DVS, wrote
to the Appellant setting out the grounds upon which he was minded to recommend
to the Minister that the Appellant’s PSV Licence and Badge should be
revoked. He referred to the
previous occasions on which the Appellant’s PSV Licence and Badge had
been suspended:-
(i)
On 19th
August 2016, they were suspended, initially indefinitely but ultimately for a
six week period, for illegally accessing the public rank at the Weighbridge, St
Helier. As a white plate holder,
she was, at the time, not permitted access to the public rank. The Appellant appealed against that
suspension. In its judgment of 6th
December, 2016, the Court rejected the Appellant’s assertion that she
thought she was permitted to use the public rank, and held that the suspension
was proportionate and that the Appellant had not been discriminated against on
the basis that she was a person undergoing a gender transition. That decision was upheld by the Court of
Appeal on 29th March 2017 (JCA051).
Quoting from paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Court of Appeal judgment:-
“37 There is no dispute of any substance as to
the essential facts before the decision-maker, and before the Royal Court. It is common ground that the appellant
used the taxi-rank, and picked up passengers, and that this was in clear breach
of the terms of her licence. The
main area of contention was whether the appellant did in fact believe that the
existence of the web-site entry excused her otherwise unlawful conduct. There was material before the
decision-maker, essentially the May to July 2016 correspondence, to support a
reasonable and rational conclusion that the purported reliance was not to be
accepted. In the course of her
submissions to this court, the appellant revealed what may have been the real
motive for her breach of the rules, and Code of Conduct. ‘I’ll be
truthful. I went on the rank because
they were doing what they wanted and ignoring me.’
38 We
are satisfied that the appellant has failed to make good her allegations that
the contents of the website entry justified or excused her actions such that it
was wrong for the DVS/Respondent to impose a period of suspension. The appellant has also failed to satisfy
the Royal Court, or this Court, that the six week suspension was
disproportionate or discriminatory, or wrong in any other way.”
(ii) On 4th January, 2018, they were
suspended for a two week period, as a result of complaints made by members of
the public in respect of what was alleged to be her abusive behaviour in
October and November 2017 due to three incidents when she had abused passengers
who had misgendered her while transporting them as passengers. That suspension was not appealed.
(iii) On 5th September, 2018, they were
suspended for a four week period for the following reasons put forward by Mr
Forrest:-
(a) Continuing to order well-meaning passengers out
of her vehicle because they had misgendered her;
(b) Ignoring the queuing system on the taxi rank;
(c) abusive communications with the DVS.
That suspension was successfully appealed
by the Appellant on the grounds of procedural unfairness, in that none of the
specific matters relied upon by Mr Forrest in his affidavit as justifying the
decision to suspend were ever put to the Appellant, which meant that the DVS
never heard any explanation which the Appellant might have had to offer prior
to reaching its decision, and took this decision in the absence of knowledge of
any extenuating or mitigating circumstances which she might have put forward. However, in its judgment of 7th
March 2019 Bisson v Minister for Infrastructure [2019] JRC 037, the
Court made it clear that the Appellant had succeeded purely on procedural
grounds, saying this:-
“40 We
would not wish the Appellant to misunderstand her success in this case. She has succeeded purely on procedural
grounds. Had these not occurred and
had we been satisfied that the factual bases for the Minister’s decision
were made out, we would have upheld the Minister’s decision to suspend
her PSV licence and badge. We
endorse the Minister’s view that it is not acceptable for a cab driver to
demand that a passenger leaves a cab mid-journey simply because the passenger
has innocently misgendered the Appellant.
The provision of a satisfactory cab service in the Island is an
important public service and the Minister is entitled to expect those who are
licensed to act as cab drivers to act in a proper manner. The appropriate response for the
Appellant in the event of a passenger innocently misgendering her is to
politely point out that she is a woman and to politely ask the passenger to
address her as such thereafter. Nothing
further is required. Nor is it
acceptable for a cab driver to write abusive and insulting emails to the DVS as
a regulator of the industry or make phone calls or make voicemails of a similar
nature. Finally, the Minister is
entitled to expect drivers to behave reasonably and join the queue in their
turn so as to avoid a free for all.
Again the Court would repeat what it said at para 49 in its earlier
judgment in Bisson:-
‘…those who join the cab profession know that it is a
regulated occupation and that disciplinary steps can be taken to enforce the
regulatory rules. If it were to
become known that the Minister would not strictly enforce the rules, we can
readily understand that a free-for-all would result.’”
8.
The Court,
on this latter occasion, was concerned with the Appellant’s conduct that led
up to her suspension on 5th September, 2018. The appeal was heard on 7th
February 2019, and the judgment issued, as we have said, on 7th
March 2019. The Court did say this
at paragraph 41:-
“41 We
wish to emphasise to the Appellant that, should she in future abuse passengers
and/or order them out of her taxi for innocently misgendering her, the Minister
may well consider he has no alternative but to suspend her for longer periods
or even revoke her PSV Licence and badge.”
9.
However,
the Court was not concerned with what had happened after the 5th September,
2018 which is set out in Mr Forrest’s letter of 16th January,
2019. Quoting from that letter:-
“Ongoing Behaviour
Regrettably, these suspensions
and warnings have had little effect on your attitude towards the public, the
DVS, its employees, and others, particularly the Law Officers’
Department. Complaints against your
behaviour, rather than diminishing on account of you understanding why
sanctions have been taken against you, have actually increased at an alarming
and unacceptable rate. In
particular, over the last few weeks, there have been seven complaints
made against you, six of which came from members of the public with whom you
have come into conflict with whilst operating your public service vehicle. Not only is your behaviour damaging to
the industry and the Island but it has, and continues to occupy, an inordinate
amount of public officials’ time.” (his emphasis)
10. Of the seven complaints received since the
September 2018 suspension, copies of the first six were sent to the Appellant
on 17th December, 2018, eliciting this response from the Appellant:-
“Thank you for your email
and letter. I have sent a copy of
it to the Bailiff’s Chambers and to the Chief Minister’s
department.
As you have not responded to my
complaints I cannot respond to yours.
Complaint numbers are
CF93677774 and CF87667735.
Clearly all complaints are
disgracefully written and your department is prejudiced forwarding them to me
suggesting I am a pervert and paedophile.”
11. The Appellant sent a further communication on
20th December, 2018:-
“Dear Mr Le Marquand,
I am offended at your letter
and its contents.
As Social Security will impose
sanctions on me if I do not respond to you, I give this response.
Complaints 1 and 2. The passenger was arguing with me. I had to stop the car for my and their
safety. I said nothing offensive to
them. It’s what they said to
me that’s the problem.
They also admit to holding me
captive like a hostage (without force) would you like me to do this to
you. They are not trained
psychiatrists.
Passengers asked to
Beachcombers then told me once at the Beachcombers that it was the name of
house. Without giving the
address. They have the wrong
gender. I am not a man they are
rude.
Complaint 4. This has no
bearing on my taxi licence. My taxi
is my private car unless I have a passenger on board. The St Clement’s Honorary Police
is discriminating me for advising you of this. Contrary to Human Rights Jersey Law 2000
punishment without law unfair trial.
Complaint 5. This driver
… was causing conflict. Have
you written to him. I am licensed for the correct number of passengers. He should mind his own business and not
be so disgusting and rude informing passengers of my transition. This is against the law and worthy of a
£10,000.00 fine. Gender Recognition (Jersey) Law 2010.
Complaint 5. They insulted my
driving. I do not drive a
fairground ride. They were told if
they do not like my driving I will stop my car and get another taxi.
I trust these answers meet your
request deadline.
Does your letter mean I am on
Santa’s naughty list and he will not visit me this year! I am disgusted
at the unreasonableness of you raising a week before Christmas.”
12. In the view of Mr Forrest, the Appellant did
not appear to deny these complaints and did not appear to demonstrate any
awareness or regret for her actions. Mr Forrest then set out in his letter of
the 16th January 2019 particulars of two incidents that had taken
place on the 20th December and Boxing day 2018, both of which had
been recorded by the Appellant on her in-car video recorder, and accordingly,
over which there is little dispute as to what actually happened. We take Mr Forrest’s descriptions
of the two incidents as follows:-
Incident concerning Ms T
In the most recent complaint in
respect of your behaviour, received by the DVS on 20 December 2018, you took
offence at your female passenger asking you a perfectly benign question whether
or not you accepted payment by card.
You immediately responded in a rude, unhelpful and aggressive manner and
when she asked you to stop the conversation, the manner of which was clearly
upsetting her, you stopped the taxi-cab and ordered her out. The passenger refused as she had heavy
shopping and it was raining, you then told her to “zip it”. She described you as being angry,
abusive and hostile. The
conversation continued, you stopped the car a second time on Mont Millais and
told her to get out again. The
passenger again refused and your response was to order her to “zip it
then, do you understand?”
When you reached the destination it transpired that your card terminal
was not working and you demanded the passenger’s credit card to process
the payment on your phone, without offering a proper explanation to the passenger
as to what you were doing and how the payment would be processed. The female passenger was eventually
reduced to tears, saying that ‘By this time I was shaking, crying and in
stunned shock’ and the following evening when she missed her bus, she was
too anxious and upset to get a taxi such was the effect you had on her the
previous evening. Such aggressive
and abusive behaviour towards a member of the public is totally unacceptable.
I have also had the opportunity
to view the footage of this incident which you voluntarily presented to the Law
Officers’ Department on a USB stick and it confirms the events as
reported by your passenger in her complaint about your unacceptable behaviour. Furthermore the footage also
demonstrates that you continually refused to give the passenger your name when
repeatedly asked, only reluctantly and eventually providing your PSV badge
number after having been asked a number of times. The footage then shows that, after the
incident, you telephoned somebody and described the passenger in shockingly
unacceptable terms. I also note
that your aggressive stance towards her seemed to increase when she informed
you of her gov.je email address, winding your front passenger window down and
shouting at her as she left the vehicle ‘you work for the government, you
should know better, you should know better!’.
Boxing Day Incident
“I also note that from
the footage you provided to the Law Officers’ Department on the USB stick
that on December 26th 2018 at around 22:45, a second incident was
recorded whereby you asked a passenger who was intoxicated to stop eating. Rather than asking him in an appropriate
and measured manner to stop, or asking him to let you keep his takeaway bag in
the front of the vehicle, you reacted disproportionately by immediately
threatening to eject him from your taxi-cab on Victoria Avenue, nowhere near
his final destination in St Ouen nor the taxi rank from which you had picked
him up. Once he had apologised and
said he would not eat, the journey continued. You then told him ‘be quiet and
don’t say anything’. He
apologised, however at a later stage he seemingly addressed you saying
‘thank you very much, by the way, you are a good man’, for which
you stopped your vehicle in the proximity of Jubilee Hill, very close to your
passenger’s destination, and asked him to get out and to pay for the
journey up to that point. You
failed to explain to him what he had said that offended you when he asked and
appeared to expect him to know, and did not offer him the chance to apologise
so you could complete the journey.
When your passenger could not get out to pay you, you took the totally
disproportionate decision to take him all the way back to town to the police
station and to call the police. The
recording confirms that throughout the exchange of words during this time, your
passenger repeatedly insisted ‘I would like to pay my fare.’
This is completely intolerable
behaviour i.e. to eject a young intoxicated person late at night away from
their destination and any public rank without good reason. I have spoken to you
before about your need to have more patience and not react disproportionately
to incidents. Telling passengers to ‘zip it’ or to sit in silence
is not something PSV drivers have a right to do.
You can, in accordance with
Article 10 of the Taxi-Cabs Order and Clause 11 of the Code of Conduct, request
passengers to stop distracting you, eating, or acting in a disorderly manner
etc. but it is disproportionate and unrealistic to expect passengers to sit in
silence.
You applied for a purple PSV
licence plate and the accompanying ability to use the public ranks. It is obvious that not every taxi
passenger, particularly those who you pick up late at night (and even more so
during the festive period), will sit there in absolute silence throughout the
journey and indeed there is no requirement for them to do so. Whilst the passenger’s later
behaviour in this particular incident was not acceptable, I am satisfied that
you caused and provoked this incident by your unnecessary and over the top
reactions to him making noise and inadvertently misgendering you.’
13. The DVS had emailed the Appellant about the
incident concerning Ms T, to which she responded by e-mail on 21st
December, 2018 as follows:-
“I note the complaints are not all in accordance with your own
process as they are not written on your own complaint form as you have
previously to….myself.
One rule for one and another for others.
It’s interesting that [MsT] made this last complaint as she is
not a member of the public but an employee of our corrupt government.
Making this entrapment. The passenger was aware of the law and she
used her work email for the credit card receipt. Its funny that during her
journey she only had a disagreement with a driver who takes card and no
arguments with those who refuse card.
Therefore, I will refuse card like all other taxis.”
14. Mr Forrest went on in his letter of the 16th
January, 2019, to complain about correspondence from the Appellant to the DVS,
the Law Officers’ Department and others, which was rude and abusive. Quoting again from his letter:-
“In addition to the
suspensions which you have incurred during the past three years, and despite
such warnings, you have repeatedly sent verbally abusive emails to the DVS
(principally my Senior Traffic Officer) as well as to other officers of the
States of Jersey and the Law Officers’ Department. Your suspension in September 2018 was
partly due to your unacceptable voicemail outburst to the DVS: ‘I
don’t want to deal with your department ever, ever again because your
department disgusts me in every kind of possible way. You are a filthy disgusting, terrible
department’.
The Law Officers’ Department
have also provided me with a litany of abusive emails that you have sent them
during the course of the litigation regarding your suspension in September,
whereby you deliberately address a male advocate as ‘Ms’, refer to
releasing your bowels, use terms such as ‘paedophile’ and
‘vagina’, and ask ‘how would like someone to knock on your
office door and ask ‘Have you still got your willy?’ and
‘Does the Bailiff wait for you to return from the toilet so he can carry
on working?’.
When previously questioned
about the manner of your correspondence, you have shown no remorse, and have
stated that you enjoy the battle with the DVS. You have offered no comfort that this
behaviour will cease going forward, despite having been given numerous
opportunities to rectify it. I
quote from my letter to you dated 5th September, 2018, when a final
opportunity was afforded by me:
‘In my opinion, there is enough evidence for me to propose to
the Minister that he revokes both your licence and badge, however I prefer to afford
you a final opportunity during the period of suspension to reflect on your
behaviour and to convince me that going forward you are capable of meeting the
standards required to continue as a PSV licence and badge holder.’
15. The letter of 16th January, 2019,
terminated with the following:-
“Revocation
The DVS can no longer tolerate
your continued irrational and uncontrolled behaviour towards members of the
public and public officials. I am minded to recommend to the Minister
under Article 10(1)(a) of the Law to revoke your Licence and under Article
30(1) of the Law to revoke your Badge.
I am considering making this
recommendation because, on the basis of your conduct, I consider that you are
no longer a fit and proper person to hold a licence to operate your public
service vehicle (Article 10(1)(a) (a) of the Law) or a badge authorising you to
drive a tax-cab (Article 30(1) of the Law). The minister has a duty to ensure an
adequate, efficient and reasonably priced cab service available throughout
Jersey at all times. Your actions
continue to damage not only the reputation of the taxi-cab industry within
Jersey but potentially the Island as a whole, particularly as PSV drivers will
often be one of the first and last persons that a visitor to the island encounters. It is also implicit in the
Minister’s duty that he must ensure that the taxi-cab industry is safe
for all passengers. Your continued
behaviour in ejecting or seeking to eject members of the public far from their
destination and refusal to desist and change your behaviour presents a
significant risk to public safety and cannot be tolerated any further.
Submissions
You have 14 days from receipt
of this letter to provide me with reasons in writing as to why I should not
recommend to the Minister that your PSV Licence and Badge be revoked. The submissions should be addressed to
me at DVS using the address at the head of this letter.
Once I have considered your
submissions, I shall decide whether to make a recommendation of revocation to
the minister or whether to impose a lesser sanction, or none at all. You will be notified of the outcome
without delay and, if applicable, be reminded of your appeal rights under the
Law.” (his emphasis)
16. The Appellant responded by letter dated 28th
January, 2019, which we would summarise by way of overview as follows:-
(i)
The
suspensions of 19th August, 2016, and 4th January, 2018,
were spent. The validity of the
suspension of 5th September, 2018, was (then) before the Court. The Appellant had complied with the Code
of Conduct issued by DVS and it was others who started the conflict.
(ii) The Code had not been updated for some time,
and was not complied with by other taxi drivers.
(iii) She was the object of victimisation. She was not treated like everybody else,
and was used as a social guinea pig, a target for other people’s
problems.
(iv) Mr Forrest was abusing the fit and proper
status and should be sending himself to a psychiatrist, as he too could be
transgender. The Appellant would be
interested in seeing his psychiatric report.
(v) Her pet dog, who has a smaller brain, was not
cruel in the way others were in Jersey, treating her so badly; she could see
the hate when they were misgendering her, which causes her distress.
(vi) She had said nothing offensive to passengers
– it was what they said to her that was the problem; in most cases,
misgendering her.
(vii) In relation to the complainant Ms T, she said this:-
“Before Ms T got into my car you will note that she said
‘Do you want me to take the car behind or this taxi’. My response was take whichever taxi you
like. To be asked this question by
an employee of the States of Jersey would suggest to me she did not want to
travel in a disabled taxi. Which is
entirely bigoted and discriminatory.
Ms T would not say this to all
taxi drivers. So I believe she
singled me out and was deliberately hostile and was a decoy for your
department.
Then she asked about credit
cards. She clearly knew the law as
she admitted this herself in my taxi and was looking for an argument. I can only assume this was one of your
mystery shoppers. Used to subject
me to discriminatory behaviour.”
(viii) Mr Forrest should question his own
department’s ethics and fairness in dealing with the Appellant, compared
to how they dealt with everyone else.
(ix)
In relation to the Boxing
day incident, she said this:-
“I make no comment to your
judgement of the Boxing Day incident as your version is incorrect. How can it be acceptable for a man to
hit a woman or want to hit a woman.
Seeing anyone receive such abuse you yourself should be setting an
example and dealing with offenders instead of using their behaviour as an
excuse to victimise others.”
(x) The Appellant denied sending verbally abusive
e-mails, saying it was up to Mr Forrest whether he took offence to them.
(xi) All of the Appellant’s complaints about
other drivers had been ignored.
(xii) Mr Forrest made her sound like a terrorist, and
that she is some sort of extremist.
She asked how her gender could be so damaging to the Island, which is
her home, where she intended to stay.
(xiii) Looking at the way she had been treated, the
States of Jersey did not seem to like transgender employees, and she was being
subjected by the DVS to discrimination.
The action Mr Forrest was proposing to take was completely inappropriate
and disproportionate.
(xiv) The DVS was not acting fairly in what should be
an inclusive society, free from intolerance and discrimination.
(xv) The DVS had not provided taxi drivers with
conflict resolution training. Bus
drivers and prison officers are trained not to discuss personal details, and
yet she had to advise passengers of her correct gender and sexual orientation.
(xvi) The DVS had made her life difficult and at
times unbearable since February 2013.
She had lost a marriage and contact with close family, relatives and
friends. She had been isolated and
left with nothing.
(xvii) It did not matter how many times she begged or
pleaded with Mr Forrest not to take her Badge or Licence, Mr Forrest did it
anyway. He paid no attention to
anything the Appellant wrote. She
guessed the matter would end up back in the Royal Court.
17. Mr Forrest waited until the Court’s
judgment of the 6th March, 2019, had been issued before preparing
his report to the Minister on the 14th March, 2019, in which he
recommended the revocation of the PSV Licence and Badge. He e-mailed the Appellant at 8:45 on the
morning of 15th March, enclosing a copy of the report, with its
appendices, saying that it would be considered by the Minister that day and
that he would inform the Appellant of the Minister’s decision once he had
met with him. The decision to
revoke was taken later that day and communicated to the Appellant at 16:27. She was told that she had 29 days in
which to appeal.
18. In her notice of appeal of 18th
March, 2019, the Appellant set out numerous grounds of appeal, many of which
are not relevant, but which we summarise by way of overview as they give
context to the decision of the Minister:-
(i)
There was
no disciplinary hearing. The
Minister sat in private with Mr Forrest on 15th March, 2019, at a
meeting at which the Appellant was not represented.
(ii) She did not enjoy battles with the DVS and as a
consequence of the revocation, had lost her job and been left with no money, no
friends, no family and no support.
(iii) She had received no training for lone workers
and taxis dealing with aggressive or abusive passengers, or in the health and
safety of passengers.
(iv) The DVS had no proper complaints procedure to
adhere to.
(v) The removal of her livelihood was contrary to
her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. She referred in particular to her right
to the protection of her property under the First Protocol and her right to
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.
(vi) The decision was discriminatory, based on a
complaint she had made about St Clement’s Honorary Police Officers
misgendering her. It had been
acknowledged by the Attorney General and dealt with informally by the police.
(vii) The Court, in its judgment of 7th
March, 2019, had given the DVS a licence to treat her as it wished, and it made
no note of her complaints of bad behaviour and bad governance.
(viii) The Minister of Home Affairs had misgendered
and shouted at her.
(ix) The Customs Department had misgendered her.
(x) The Minister was conflicted, as the Appellant
had reported him for breaching the Planning Law on 7th August, 2007,
and this in relation to his home, Fern Cottage.
(xi) The decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.
(xii) It was wholly unfair and discriminatory of the
Court to allow the respondent to inform all cab drivers of her gender
recognition certificate, making the judgment (we assume of the 7th
March, 2019) public, contrary to her Convention rights to privacy.
(xiii) She was being deliberately forced out of the
taxi industry unjustly, when other taxi drivers have been reported to DVS and
the police, and had gone without punishment.
(xiv) The revocation was solely based on gender, made
by persons of the opposite gender, making the decision discriminatory and
sexist.
(xv) In including details of earlier suspensions and
court judgments, the Appellant was effectively being tried twice for the same
offence, as all the accusations showed deliberate misgendering. All the complaints flowed from what had
now been determined an illegal suspension.
(xvi) Another taxi driver had been convicted for
assault without his licence being revoked and the Appellant had not assaulted
anyone, but faced a lifetime revocation, which was wholly disproportionate and
unfair.
(xvii) The contents of Mr Forrest’s report of 14th
March, 2019, were designed to manipulate and provide the Court with an unfair
conscious bias, designed to prejudice the Appellant. The report was highly toxic and made
spurious allegations.
(xviii) Mr Forrest had himself owned a motor car which
was driven with defective nearside brake light on 25th May 2018.
(xix) The Court is ultra vires in adjudicating the appeal, as it regulates the
regulator by ignoring the Gender Recognition (Jersey) Law 2010.
(xx) The Jersey Financial Services Commission had
misgendered the Appellant in 2019.
The Court should regulate the regulator rather than focusing on one
person, which was victimisation.
(xxi) The Appellant had only been given two days’
notice to respond to the allegations made against her, which was plainly
unfair, as she had made complaints regarding the DVS which had been ignored by
it.
(xxii) On 4th March, 2019, a traffic
officer at the DVS shared information about a third party with the Appellant
which was none of the Appellant’s business, and in breach of data
protection.
(xxiii) The Appellant had never been given the
opportunity to work unhindered without some kind of abuse from other taxi
drivers or members of the public.
(xxiv) The
DVS had not implemented any of the recommendations contained in the Taxi
Regulatory Reform – Recommendations (October 2013).
(xxv) Another taxi driver had fallen asleep at the
wheel and hit three cars in procession, but still drives a taxi.
(xxvi) Another taxi driver allegedly aimed his taxi at
a parking control officer, and was only suspended for a week, as reported in
the Jersey Evening Post on 29th January 2019.
(xxvii) The DVS refused to allow the Appellant to drive
any normal car, advising her that she had to remain in a wheelchair accessible
vehicle for five years, again treating her less favourably.
(xxviii) The Appellant had made complaints to the
police, who had treated her with hostility. Two officers had misgendered her
regularly and nothing had been done, and this had been reported to the Attorney
General, and nothing had happened.
(xxix) The letter of revocation failed to notify her
of the number of days she had in which to file an appeal. We would interpose to note that the
letter of the 15th March, 2018, clearly did specify the number of
days in which to appeal.
(xxx) In
the case of Bisson –v- Minister [2015] JRC 084, the Commissioner,
in his judgment, did not treat the Appellant with respect, and made fun of the
Appellant for not completing a successful Order of Justice.
(xxxi) On 3rd July, 2018, at the DVS, a
traffic officer checking her vehicle had misgendered her, without apology.
(xxxii) On 13th July 2018, at the taxi rank,
the Appellant refused to carry a passenger who had addressed her as
“Sir”, as a result of which, a security marshal had sworn at her.
(xxxiii) On 14th August, 2018, two taxi
drivers had purchased wigs and paraded around the Appellant’s car wearing
them and laughing at her.
(xxxiv) On 2nd September, 2018, the
Appellant had been subjected to abuse when pulling up at the Weighbridge rank
ahead of other taxis who had refused to move forward, and which, she assumed,
were not working.
(xxxv)Mr Forrest had allowed abusive behaviour by
other taxi drivers.
(xxxvi) The decision to revoke is a restraint on trade.
(xxxvii) Mr Forrest had sent a letter to the
Appellant’s brother on 2nd August, 2018, which questioned the
state of her mental health.
(xxxviii) The Appellant had been involved in so many
cases before the Court that she could not now be treated fairly.
19. The Appellant filed an affidavit dated 30th
April, 2019, in support of her appeal, which covers very similar ground, but
reiterating that it was unfair for the Minister to hold a disciplinary hearing
without the right of the Appellant to be accompanied by a legally competent
person or even a witness. Previous
meetings held with the DVS had never been described as disciplinary
meetings. No procedural process has
been adhered to by the DVS and there are no published guidelines.
20. In her affidavit of 22nd May, 2019,
she exhibited a number of documents, including:-
(i)
A news
report of a taxi driver reported driving at a traffic warden published on 29th
January, 2019.
(ii) Two copies of her gender recognition
certificate issued on 12th January, 2018, under the provisions of
the Gender Recognition (Jersey) Law 2010, showing that, as from that
date, the Appellant’s gender was female. In one of the certificates, the name of
the Law was incorrectly set out.
(iii) A press release of 10th April 2015,
from Trans* Jersey, highlighting the difficulties the Appellant was having
changing the title on documents.
(iv) Three letters from the States of Jersey Police
dated 3rd May 2018, 31st January 2019 and 17th
May 2019, rejecting complaints made by the Appellant against States of Jersey
Police and staff, all of which were regarded as fruitless.
(v) Extract from Insights posted on 24th
May, 2016, about the Appellant’s successful complaint to the Jersey Employment
and Discrimination Tribunal of discrimination by Condor Ferries.
(vi) A letter from the Chief Nurse of Health and
Community Services dated 14th September 2018, relating to complaints
made from the Appellant in relation to her gender.
(vii) A copy of an e-mail from Planning and Building
Services confirming that planning and building permission was required for work
to Fern Cottage, St Saviour – according to the Appellant, the property
belonging to the Minister.
(viii) An e-mail from Jersey Customs and Immigration
Service apologising for an officer referring to the Appellant as
“Sir” in a telephone call made on Friday 15th February
2019.
(ix) Copy e-mail correspondence with the Jersey
Financial Services Commission regarding the Appellant’s complaint about
being called “Sir” about ten times.
(x) An e-mail from the Connétable of St
Clement, apologising for the Appellant being misgendered by being called
“Sir” during a road check and on the telephone, for which there was
an apology.
(xi) A letter from the Ministry of Justice dated 12th
March 2019, declining to consider the Appellant’s complaints about the
Jersey judicial service.
(xii) A news report of an advocate who was fined
£4,000 for having a dog out of control on four separate occasions.
(xiii) A disclaimer notice from the Jersey Taxi
Drivers’ Association, issued, we were told on 29th June 2018,
making it clear to its customers that the Appellant (we believe) is not a
member of the Association, and would never be allowed to become a member
because of her poor disciplinary record and discourtesy shown towards members
of the public who use the taxi ranks.
The Association and its members felt strongly that this person is
tarnishing the reputation of all decent taxi drivers in Jersey, and is not a
fit and proper person to hold a PSV Licence. It stated that the Association had
written to the Head of DVS saying that enough is enough, and requesting that
something be done.
Recusal
21. The Appellant had given notice to the Court
that she intended to apply to have the Commissioner recused from presiding over
the appeal for the reasons set out in paragraph 18 (xxx) above namely that in
the case of Bisson –v- Minister [2015] JRC 084, the Commissioner,
in his judgment, did not treat the Appellant with respect and made fun of the
Appellant for not completing a successful Order of Justice. In the event, she did not make that
application, but notwithstanding, the Commissioner referred to the test, namely
whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a
real possibility or real danger that he was biased (Re Esteem [2001] JLR
169) and concluded that there was no such real possibility or danger. In particular, the appellant had been
unable to point to anything in the judgment that showed that the Commissioner
had treated her with disrespect. The
only reference to an Order of Justice prepared by the Appellant was in fact
made by a different judge at an earlier hearing (paragraph 12 of the judgment).
Evidence on behalf of the Minister
22. Mr Forrest filed an affidavit exhibiting the
relevant correspondence, in particular in relation to the complaints and the
responses of the Appellant. The
Appellant questioned the validity of his affidavit on the basis that the
signature page contained no date.
The exhibit page is clearly dated 15th April, 2019, and we
are satisfied that that is the date upon which it was sworn before an Advocate
of the Court.
23. Mr Forrest sets out the history of complaints
received from members of the public in respect of the conduct of the Appellant,
which involved, in the main, being ejected from the Appellant’s taxi and
being subjected to abuse for misgendering her. Complaints were received on 19th
September, 2017, 16th October, 2017, 18th November, 2017,
7th December, 2017, and 20th July, 2018 leading up to the
5th September, 2018, suspension and, of course, the seven complaints
that followed as detailed above. There
seems to be no dispute as to the Appellant ejecting passengers in this way, and
indeed, she has produced video footage showing her doing just that.
24. Mr Forrest goes on to describe the abusive
e-mails, telephone calls and voice messages from the Appellant. A warning letter had been sent to her sent on 20th March, 2017:-
“It has been brought to
my attention by other departments and noted by me personally that much of the
content contains abusive and at times personal comments that are totally
unacceptable. This is consistent
with the nature of your emails going back a number of years and in particular
since you were suspended in August/September 2016.
There are various examples
which I could refer you to where you have used many derogatory terms towards
officers of the above mentioned departments and have made outrageous comments
regarding fascism, Nazism, slavery and cancer. You have been warned by the Law
officers’ Department about this rude and insulting approach and yet have
continued to ignore such warnings.”
25. That letter went on to warn:-
“Your behaviour casts
serious doubt on whether, should you choose to reapply for the grant of a PSV
Licence, you can be considered to be a fit and proper person for the purposes
of Article 9(1) of the Motor Traffic Law.
It also, for the same reasons, raises serious doubts as to whether you
can be considered a fit person to hold a badge for the purposes of Article 30
of the Motor Traffic Law.”
26. Mr Forrest explains that at a meeting on 25th
July, 2018, the Appellant was repeatedly questioned as to how she intended to
deal with similar situations should they occur in the future, but gave no
assurances that she was prepared to take a different approach, or indeed,
showed no remorse or indication that she felt she had done anything wrong. That combined with the abusive
communications and the Appellant ignoring the queuing arrangements on the
waiting area behind the Weighbridge rank by bypassing it and parking
incorrectly in the rank ahead of other waiting rank drivers, led to the
decision on 5th September, 2018, to suspend the Appellant’s
PSV licence and Badge for a period of four weeks. As explained above, that decision was
quashed by the Court on the grounds of procedural unfairness in that the
Appellant had not been asked to give her side of things in relation to any of
the matters relied upon.
27. Notwithstanding the reported suspension on 5th
September, 2018, complaints in relation to her conduct continued, leading to Mr
Forrest’s letter of 16th January, 2019, notifying the
Appellant that he was minded to recommend to the Minister that her PSV Licence
and Badge be revoked, as detailed above.
Decision
28. Turning to the first three tests to be applied
in an unqualified appeal of this kind, it is not in dispute that the Minister
has the power to revoke the Appellant’s PSV Licence and Badge under the
provisions of Article 10(1) and 30(1) of the Motor Traffic Law.
29. We note that there is a difference between the
two articles, namely that under Article 10(1)(a), the Minister may revoke a PSV
Licence if the holder is no longer a “fit and proper person to operate
the public service provided by the vehicle having regard to the holder’s
conduct”, whereas, under Article 30(1), the Minister may revoke
the Badge if the holder is not a “fit person to drive a public service vehicle
of the type specified on the badge.” The former is concerned with the
provision of a public service provided by the vehicle having regard to the
holder’s conduct and the latter, with the fitness of the person to drive
that vehicle. Nothing in our view turns upon the point, as the Minister relies
upon the same underlying conduct of the Appellant in respect of both
revocations.
30. In our view, the Minister was entitled to look
at the whole history of the Appellant’s conduct as a taxi driver,
including the conduct that led up to the suspensions on 19th August,
2016 and 4th January 2018 and the purported suspension on 5th
September, 2018, which was set aside on procedural grounds only. Complaints have, of course, continued
since those suspensions. On this
occasion, through Mr Forrest’s letter of the 16th January,
2019, the Appellant has been given an opportunity to respond in relation to all
of the complaints and has done so.
31. Article 38 of the Motor Traffic Law requires
the Minister “to ensure that, in so far as it is practical to do so, there is an
adequate, sufficient and reasonably priced cab service available throughout
Jersey at all times” and pursuant to Article 9
“that the cab service is operated by fit and proper persons.”
32. It is not in dispute that the DVS has received
the complaints from members of the public, summarised above, and, for the most
part, the Appellant does not deny that incidents took place: indeed, some of
them have been videoed by her. The
underlying theme that emerges from the evidence is of the Appellant taking
offence at being misgendered by passengers and reacting by removing those
passengers from her cab, often some distance from the destination, and/or
verbally abusing them. The abusive
nature of the Appellant’s communications with the DVS is self-evident.
33. The Appellant asserts that the decision to
revoke is based entirely on her gender, and has been made by persons of the
opposite gender, which she says makes it discriminatory and sexist. There is no evidence to support this
assertion and we reject it.
34. The Appellant complains that as a litigant in
person she is at an unfair disadvantage.
She produced a letter from Legal Aid Jersey declining legal aid on the
basis of the written opinion from Viberts.
Looking at the published judgments on JLIB, it is fair to say that the
Appellant now has some considerable experience of conducting proceedings as a
litigant in person, and the Court permitted her to be assisted at the hearing
by her brother. Article 6 of the
Convention does not give a litigant in civil proceedings a right to legal
representation, and the fact that the Appellant represents herself does not
render the proceedings unfair. The
Court gave her ample opportunity to present her case.
35. As the Court commented in the judgement of the
7th March, 2019, the Appellant is sensitive if persons misgender her
(paragraph 10) and feels aggrieved that the DVS has, she alleges, done nothing
to pursue her complaints about other taxi drivers misgendering her (paragraph
42). The Court invited the DVS to
consider whether it would be appropriate to circulate all the taxi drivers to
point out that the Appellant is in law a female and that it is not acceptable
for them to deliberately misgender her (paragraph 43).
36. The difficulty is that these observations were
made by the Court on the 7th March, 2019, based on the
Appellant’s conduct up to the 5th September, 2018 suspension. No less than seven complaints from the
public followed that suspension. We
have little documentation in relation to the Appellant’s own complaints
to the DVS and no evidence from the DVS as to how those complaints have been
processed, but unacceptable as deliberate misgendering by other taxi drivers
is, assuming that the complaints are made out, the Minister is concerned with
the public and the provision of an important service to them.
37. The complaints from the public show that when
they have misgendered the Appellant, often at night when it is difficult to see
clearly, it has been innocent and the Appellant’s over reaction to it has
been equally unacceptable.
38. A good example is the complaint to the DVS by
Ms A on the 16th October, 2017. She and her sister had been driven by the
Appellant to their home. When they
got there the sister said to Ms A something along the lines of “I’ll give him £10”,
which led to what she described as a tirade of abuse and foul language.
39. It is the appellant’s over reaction to
such innocent misgendering that underlies most of the complaints that have been
made regularly by the public over some three years leading up to Christmas
2018. The Appellant appears to make
no allowance for the possibility that those members of the public who misgender
her, do so innocently and she showed no intention of ameliorating her conduct,
despite numerous warnings.
40. In her second supplemental written submission
received after the hearing, the Appellant referred in particular to the conduct
of another taxi driver, who she said had paraded round her car wearing a wig,
goading her and causing conflict.
The Appellant had clearly made a complaint to the police sometime in
2019 about this conduct, as in or around the 19th June, 2019, they
had informed her that on the advice of the Law Officers Department “a harassment notice” (presumably
under the Crime (Disorderly Conduct and Harassment)(Jersey) Law 2008)
was not going to be sought against that driver. The fact that this driver was able to
continue earning his living despite this and other complaints about him to DVS
showed, the Appellant argued, that the motivation behind the revocation was
retaliatory. We reject as
unsupportable the suggestion that Mr Forrest and the Minister, in recommending
and revoking the PSV Licence and Badge respectively, were motivated by a desire
to retaliate against the Appellant for making this and earlier complaints about
other drivers.
41. We do not regard the lack of conflict
resolution training by the DVS, of which the Appellant complains, as providing
her with any excuse for what are palpably breaches of the Code of Conduct, in
particular the duty to be courteous to the public and to avoid conflict.
42. Having considered the evidence, we are not
persuaded by the Appellant that the decision of the Minister to revoke her PSV
Licence and Badge was wrong. This
is, as we say, an important public service and it is important that drivers are
courteous (Clause 2 of the Code of Conduct), take passengers to their
destination unless there is good reason to end the hire (Clause 11 of the Code
of Conduct), and do not involve themselves in conflict (Clause 19 of the Code
of Conduct). The Minister was
entitled on the evidence before him to find that the Appellant had been in
repeated breaches of these important duties.
43. The decision to revoke her Licence deprives the
Appellant of her livelihood, and it must therefore be proportionate. We have considered this carefully and
note the following:-
(i)
The
Appellant’s misconduct has been persistent over many years.
(ii) The sanctions imposed by the DVS have been
measured, with suspensions imposed on 19th August, 2016, 4th
January, 2018 and 5th September, 2018, the last being set aside on
purely procedural grounds.
(iii) The Appellant had therefore received repeated
warnings as to her conduct and, notwithstanding the complaints that led up to
the 5th September, 2018, suspension, her misconduct continued with
the DVS receiving no less than a further seven complaints. The Court dealing with the 5th
September, 2018, suspension was concerned only with the complaints that led up
to that suspension.
(iv) Having set out his position in his letter of 16th
January, 2019, Mr Forrest then waited until the judgment of 7th
March, 2019, had been issued and would therefore be taken into account by the
Minister. The procedural defect
highlighted by the Court had already been remedied by that letter. The Appellant had been given clear notice
of all of the complaints against her and had responded to them.
44. Given this long history and the multiple
opportunities given to the Appellant to correct her behaviour and given the
Appellant’s combative and uncompromising response of 28th
January, 2019, in our view, the Minister had little option but to accept the
recommendation of Mr Forrest and revoke her PSV Licence and Badge. In our view the decision was
proportionate.
45. We turn finally to the correctness and fairness
of the procedure, and whether the proceedings of the DVS and the Minister were in
general sufficient and satisfactory.
46. There is a published Code of Conduct for taxi
drivers to which we have referred, but there is no published disciplinary
procedure to deal with complaints from the public about the conduct of taxi
drivers, so we must examine the fairness of the actual procedure adopted in the
case of the Appellant.
47. The Appellant complains that there was no
disciplinary hearing in this case, but there is no requirement under the Motor
Traffic Law for a hearing to be held, and it would be unduly burdensome to
place such an obligation upon the Minister.
48. Procedural fairness has been described as a
flexi-principle. There are no rigid
or universal rules as to what is needed in order to be procedurally fair, with
the content of the duty depending on the particular function and circumstances
of the individual case. (See R (Shoesmith) v Ofsted [2011] EWCA Civ 642
at paragraph 52). As Sir John Dyson
SCJ explained in the case of In re Application for Judicial Review by JR17
[2010] UKS 27 at paragraph 50:-
“The right to have a
reasonable opportunity of learning what is alleged against the person when
putting forward his or her answer to it ‘is one of the fundamental rights
according to the common law rules of natural justice.’”
49. In our view, fairness in this case required the
following, namely the Appellant being given:-
1.
Prior
notice of what was intended;
2.
Adequate
disclosure of the evidence that would be relied on; and
3.
The
opportunity to make representations.
50. In this case, the Appellant was given prior
notice of what was intended. In his
letter of 16th January, 2019, Mr Forrest stated very clearly in the
second paragraph that he was minded to recommend revocation and added bold
emphasis on that particular point:-
“Your misconduct has
regularly continued and increased, and has therefore prompted me to take
further action. I am minded to recommend to the Minister to revoke your
PSV Licence and Badge. The
reasons for this decision are explained fully in this letter.”
51. We agree, therefore, with Advocate Meiklejohn
that the Appellant would have been in no doubt as to the severity of the
sanction she was facing and that the representations she was invited to provide
would be important and would be her chance to put her case forward.
52. Mr Forrest then went on to make it clear the
procedure that would follow:-
“As detailed at the foot
of this letter, you have the opportunity to make representations to me before I
make the final decision on this recommendation, and your representations will
be shared with the Minister, should I make such recommendation.”
53. Accordingly, the representations the Appellant
was being invited to submit in response to this letter would be shared with the
Minister, and this would be her sole opportunity to make her case as to why the
PSV Licence and Badge should not be revoked. There was no indication or expectation
that the Appellant would be invited to repeat her submissions or a variance of
them at the stage the matter went to the Minister. At the conclusion of the letter, Mr
Forrest again underlines that he is minded to recommend revocation and says:-
“You have 14 days from
receipt of this letter to provide me with reasons in writing as to why I should
not recommend to the Minister that your PSV Licence and Badge should be
revoked. The submissions should be
addressed to me at DVS using the address at the head of this letter.
Once I have considered your
submissions, I shall decide whether to make a recommendation to the Minister,
or whether to impose a lesser sanction, or none at all. You will be notified of the outcome
without delay and, if applicable, be reminded of your appeal rights under the
Law.”
54. Mr Forrest’s letter sets out very fully
the evidence upon which his recommendation would be based, so we are satisfied
that the Appellant had prior notice of what was intended, adequate disclosure
of the evidence that would be relied upon and an opportunity to make
representations to the Minister.
That she did by her lengthy letter of 28th January, 2019.
55. Having waited for the Court’s judgment of
6th March 2019, Mr Forrest then prepared his report to the Minister
on 14th March, 2019. As
we said above he e-mailed the Appellant at 08:45 on the morning of 15th
March, 2019, enclosing a copy of the report, with its appendices, saying that
it would be considered by the Minister that day and that he would inform the
Appellant of the Minister’s decision once he had met with them. The decision was taken later that day,
and communicated to the Appellant at 16:27.
56. This aspect of the procedure gave us cause for
concern, namely that the Appellant had not been given sufficient time to
respond to Mr Forrest’s report and to make representations on it to the
Minister. We invited further written
submissions from the parties in relation to this. The Appellant did not seem to us to
address the issue we had raised, but in any event, we have concluded that this
did not render the procedure unfair for the following reasons:-
(i)
The letter
of 16th January, 2019, stated that, if so minded, Mr Forrest would
be making a recommendation to the Minister that the Appellant’s PSV
Licence and Badge would be revoked.
The Appellant’s representations would be shared with the Minister,
but the Appellant would not otherwise be involved in that process.
(ii) The report set out and relied upon the same
evidence as set out in Mr Forrest’s letter of 16th January,
2019, and so no new evidence was put forward to the Minister upon which the
Appellant had not been able to respond.
(iii) The report did contain a brief commentary on
aspects of the Appellant’s letter of 28th January, 2019,
which, in Mr Forrest’s view, were either inaccurate or irrelevant, which
in our view was appropriate, in providing a report to the Minister.
(iv) Inviting the Appellant to respond to the
report, apart from delaying the matter, would simply have given her an
opportunity to repeat what she had said in her letter of 28th
January, 2019, in respect of the evidence relied upon.
57. We consider, therefore, that the proceedings
were, in general, sufficient and satisfactory.
Conclusion
58. Having addressed all three aspects of the test
on this appeal, we conclude that the Minister had the power to make the
decision to revoke the Appellant’s PSV Licence and Badge, the proceedings
were in general sufficient and satisfactory and the Appellant has not satisfied
us that the decision was wrong.
59. We confirm the decision of the Minister and
dismiss the appeal.
Authorities
Motor Traffic (Jersey) Law 1935.
JT (Jersey) Limited v Jersey
Competition Regulatory Authority [2013]
Bisson
v Minister for Infrastructure [2019] JRC 037
Gender Recognition (Jersey) Law 2010
Bisson –v- Minister [2015] JRC
084
Re
Esteem [2001] JLR 169
Crime (Disorderly Conduct and
Harassment)(Jersey) Law 2008
R (Shoesmith) v
Ofsted [2011] EWCA Civ 642